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Abstract: This paper examines changes to the accounting system of
the Spanish tobacco monopoly in 1887, following the decision by the
state to lease the publicly owned and state-run monopoly to a private-
sector company. The switch to private-sector management generated
a fundamental change in the demands made of the accounting sys-
tem. As a result, double-entry bookkeeping and a new method of
calculating costs were implemented. The paper discusses the motives
behind the design of the new accounting system and its consequences
using the framework provided by agency theory. It highlights the
need to consider the role of the capital structure of the firm and the
state as explanatory factors for both the parameters and uses of cost
accounting information.
INTRODUCTION
Contributions addressing the emergence of cost accounting
practices in organizations have provided important insights into
the broader processes involved in the production of accounting
information. Competitive pressures [e.g., Johnson and Kaplan,
1987; Edwards and Newell, 1991; Fleischman and Parker, 1991,
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1997], enforcement of disciplinary practices [e.g., Hoskin and
Macve, 1986, 1988], and the quest for greater labor productivity
[Hopper and Armstrong, 1991] have been highlighted as under-
pinning the development of cost management systems. Much of
this research has focused on Anglo-American settings character-
ized by strong, competitive environments. In spite of several
contributions on the role of government agency [e.g., Ezzamel et
al., 1990; Tyson, 1993], evidence about the nature of and mo-
tives behind such practices in other contexts is still needed. This
paper, by examining the privatization of the Spanish tobacco
monopoly in 1887, will explore the impact of ownership struc-
ture on management accounting systems. This privatization did
not entail changes either in the competitive environment or in
the productive technology used by the industry, allowing us to
isolate the influence of the shift from public to private owner-
ship on such practices. Archival evidence was gathered from
three primary sources. The Archive of the Tobacco Company
(Archivo de Histórico de la Fábrica de Tabacos de Sevilla, AHFTS)
and the Intermediate Archive of the Tobacco Company (Archivo
Intermedio de la Fábrica de Tabacos de Sevilla) constitute com-
prehensive sources for understanding internal developments at
the tobacco factory. In addition, the Bank of Spain houses the
Archive of the Bank of Spain (Archivo Histórico del Banco de
España, AHBE), which is essential for investigating the
privatization of the tobacco monopoly.
In recent times, the Spanish tobacco monopoly has been
extensively studied. Carmona et al. [1997] examined from a
Foucauldian perspective the implementation by 1773 of a cost
accounting system. They showed cost calculations to be part of
a strong disciplinary regime that enhanced visibility and served
to establish a system of calculability that rendered human ac-
countability visible. Carmona et al. [1998] used an institutional
theory framework to explain changes to financial and cost ac-
counting practices throughout the period from 1760 to 1790.
They concluded that new accounting practices emerged as a
means of enhancing the external legitimacy of the organization.
Carmona and Macías [2001] studied the implementation of bud-
gets and cost accounting procedures in the period from 1820 to
1887. They focused on the state’s motivation in exerting institu-
tional pressures aimed at the implementation of early cost man-
agement practices and studied different organizational re-
sponses to simultaneous pressures arising from a single
institutional source. In the period analyzed in all these papers,
the monopoly was publicly owned and state-run. Finally, Macías
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[2002] explored determinants of accounting disclosure by ana-
lyzing the evolution of corporate financial reporting throughout
the first leasing contract (1887-1896). The current paper also
analyzes the impact of the privatization process but is signifi-
cantly different in its exploration of the factors driving the de-
sign of management accounting information at the factory level,
the tobacco factory of Seville being the unit of analysis. It is
argued that the shift from public to private management en-
tailed a fundamental change in the philosophy of management,
with profitability and efficiency being privileged. Thus, a new
demand for accounting information emerged with an appropri-
ately redesigned accounting system.
The remainder of the paper is divided into five sections. In
the next section, the theoretical framework is discussed. The
historical context, the characteristics of the tobacco industry
and the privatization process is then discussed. The subsequent
section deals with the impact of privatization on management
accounting systems. This is followed by a discussion of findings
and conclusions.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Agency theory has highlighted the influence of different di-
visions of property rights in the emergence of efficient organiza-
tional forms [Jensen and Meckling, 1976]. The definition of
property rights affects both the incentive schemes and the de-
sign of control mechanisms that regulate the relationship be-
tween principal and agent. In state-owned firms, the diffuse na-
ture of ownership provides owners with low incentives to
control management. Managers of state-owned firms may be-
have in ways which are not consistent with the interests of own-
ers for three main reasons: (i) the existence of multiple objec-
tives [Rees, 1984; Utton, 1986]; (ii) the absence of tight, external
controls given no threat of take-over [Wright and Thompson,
1994] or bankruptcy exist [Kornai, 1986; Vickers and Yarrow,
1988; Stiglitz, 1989]; and, (iii) the existence of soft, internal
control. Monitoring systems are expected to be bureaucratic,
focusing on legal aspects [Bös, 1991]. Private ownership, on the
contrary, is assumed to enhance management accountability
and improve performance [Donahue, 1989; Jensen, 1989;
Zeckhauser and Horn, 1989; Goodman and Loveman, 1991].
The assumption that ownership per se creates an environment
that is conductive to high or low performance has been con-
tested [Aharoni, 2000, p. 50]. Economic literature has tradition-
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ally focused on Anglo-Saxon and other developed economies in
which privatization has been undertaken through the selling-off
of public enterprises in a context of simultaneous deregulation
and the prevalence of external control mechanisms. However,
this scenario is not always the case. Recent literature on
privatization [e.g., Dharwadkar, 2000; Ramamurti, 2000] has ex-
amined the situation in emerging economies where neither capi-
tal markets nor economic institutions are well-developed, em-
phasizing the importance of government’s residual ownership
and the type of capital the firm attracts to understand the results
of privatization cases. Post-privatization operations of the firm
and the strategy of the acquirer may be heavily influenced by
the terms stipulated by government [Freudenberg and Bird,
1991; Uhlenbruck and DeCastro, 1998]. The outcome of
privatization is not always the same type of private firm. There-
fore, factors such as national characteristics, the role of the
state, and the internal organization of the privatized firm may
explain changes in management concerns and the behavior that
follows privatization processes [Lenway and Murtha, 1994;
DeCastro and Uhlenbruck, 1997; Uhlenbruck and DeCastro,
1998; Aharoni, 2000].
This paper addresses a privatization process with strong
similarities to the situation that exists when control mechanisms
develop in emerging economies. The paper attempts to explain
changes to the management of the tobacco monopoly following
the 1887 privatization and its implications for accounting sys-
tems. Accounting systems are part of those organizational
mechanisms that monitor and evaluate the decision-making be-
havior of agents, representing an important issue for under-
standing the differences between public and private manage-
ment [Fama and Jensen, 1983].
THE EVOLUTION OF THE TOBACCO MONOPOLY: FROM
HIERARCHICAL TO CONTRACTUAL ARTICULATION
The tobacco industry was monopolized in 1637, becoming
one of the main fiscal monopolies in Spain. Fiscal monopolies
are legal reservations for private firms to engage in certain eco-
nomic activities, acquiring from the state exclusive rights for the
provision of a product or service and giving rise thereby to a
double-layer, agency relationship. The state acts as an agent for
citizens as the ultimate owners but simultaneously becomes a
principal by granting the monopoly. When the state is the prin-
cipal in an agency relationship, two crucial issues emerge [Lane,
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1997]: (i) the public or private nature of the agent with which
the government is willing to interact, and (ii) the way in which
this interaction is articulated. This can be broadly classified in
hierarchical or contractual relationships. The election of a pri-
vate or public agent concerns institutional arrangements; that is,
how to regulate, contract, and control so as to impact directly
the incentives and sanctions that encourage managers to im-
prove performance [Bös, 1991; Odgen and Watson, 1996].
The monopolization of the Spanish tobacco industry was at
first seen as a way of avoiding technical problems in tax collec-
tion and of minimizing corruption through the implementation
of more direct control [Maureta, 1975]. While the tobacco mo-
nopoly was enacted in 1637, some private activities were main-
tained. In 1731, however, the state took full control of the indus-
try, concentrating manufacturing in the factory of Seville and
creating a special department (Steering Agency at the Treasury
Ministry, SATM) to manage it. Direct management, it was
thought, would generate an increase in the state’s revenues
through an improvement of control and efficiency [Rodríguez
Gordillo, 1990].
The Tobacco Industry in the 19th Century: Since the early years
of the 19th century, the organization of the tobacco industry
underwent dramatic changes linked to political and ideological
developments. In 1830, the last absolutist king, Fernando VII,
died and the country entered into a long and far reaching period
of change. The transition from the ancien régime to a modern
state implied major institutional reforms. With regard to the
organization of economic activities, liberals began a process of
deregulation and dismantling of state-owned enterprises. This
process never crystallized in the case of the tobacco monopoly
despite the ideological opposition of liberals to monopolies. The
financial distress of the state and the importance of the tobacco
industry to the state’s finances (in the 19th century it repre-
sented, on average, 12.5% of ordinary income) aborted every
attempt to deregulate the monopoly. The liberal courts of Cadiz
made the first move towards liberalization in September 1813,
but as soon as the political situation reversed in 1814, the mo-
nopoly was reinstated. In 1821 liberals gained political power
and the tobacco industry was likewise deregulated. However, a
decrease in the state’s income and a political change provoked a
reversal in the government’s mind and a return to the monopoly.
In 1844, the tobacco industry was leased to a private company,
and, again, a political change ended in the restoration of direct
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management by the Treasury. In 1852, Parliament began to dis-
cuss the deregulation, and a new proposal of liberalization was
included in the Constitutional Law of 1855. Once more, political
change impeded implementation. In April 1866, there was a par-
tial deregulation of the tobacco industry, affecting only the
Spanish colonies of Cuba and Puerto Rico. This measure lasted
just a few months. The Revolution of 1868 brought further
changes. In June 1869, the tobacco and salt industries were de-
regulated, but, in 1871, the situation was again reversed as the
monopoly was re-imposed. Finally, in 1887, management of the
industry was leased to a private company.
By the time of privatization, the tobacco industry was large
and complex. The industry was comprised of different operating
units. Acquisition was organized by the SATM and the Dirección
General de Contabilidad through agents at a number of places
(Spain, the U.S., the American colonies, and the Philippine Is-
lands). Manufacturing operations were developed in nine facto-
ries, managed by the SASM, though the Dirección General del
Tesoro Público was in charge of cash operations. Sales and dis-
tribution were also organized by the Dirección General del
Tesoro Público through a system of provincial and local ware-
houses that supplied more than 18,000 tobacconists. Finally,
one of the critical aspects of the industry, the fight against
smuggling, was within the purview of the Army. The industry
endured a tension between subordination to the administrative
hierarchy, while at the same time exhibiting a certain level of
economic and accounting flexibility [Tejerizo López, 1975].
Whereas a degree of independence in its functioning existed, a
subordination to hierarchical rules and bureaucratic procedures
anchored efficient management, especially in the context of a
political instability that led to a high turnover of the ministry’s
head officers. This in turn impaired consistency in reform ef-
forts throughout the century.
The tobacco industry employed approximately 32,000
manufacturing workers, most of them female. Within the facto-
ries, work was organized by product lines [García de Torres,
1884]. Each product line (cigars, plug tobacco, cigarettes, and,
subsequently, snuff) constituted a “factory” under the charge of
an operating manager, assisted by several middle managers.
Factories were composed of a number of workshops directed by
a maestra. Maestras, middle managers, and operating managers
were state employees. They received a monthly salary and were
charged with controlling the production process and recording
the flow of tobacco leaves and products. The rest of the work
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force received piece rates that corresponded in amount to the
complexity of the product manufactured. Tobacco leaves were
distributed daily to the workshops with the physical flow of
tobacco recorded by the maestras. They were also responsible
for assessing the conformity of final products to quality require-
ments. Careful tracking of the production of each worker was
kept and served as the basis for wage payment. Operating man-
agers also kept records of the tobacco distributed and the final
products received from the different workshops.
Piece rates and the composition of tobacco products were
fixed by a number of legal regulations. Both were established
when a new product was launched. In these cases, experiments
were run to determine the blend of tobacco and the time spent
in manufacturing so that an adequate salary could be deter-
mined based upon the difficulty of the task. Although extensive
legislation covered every aspect of work in the factories, a lack
of uniformity became a major concern for the ministry as the
industry expanded. Regulations covered the blend of different
tobacco leaves for each product, the proportion between input
and output, and other technical specifications such as length,
thickness, or weight of final products. As time passed, these
rules hardened into production standards, impairing improve-
ments in efficiency as they were seldom revised [Comín and
Martín Aceña, 1999]. Additionally, in spite of the extensive regu-
lation, uniformity was difficult to achieve because the quality, as
well as the physical aspect of the final product, was highly de-
pendent upon the dexterity of individual workers, the quality of
the tobacco leaves received, and the speed with which products
were distributed to consumers.
While the Treasury attempted to increase centralization in
decision making throughout the century, the growth of the in-
dustry and the political circumstances affecting public adminis-
tration served to divorce decision making from action [see
Carmona and Macías, 2001]. For instance, Delgado [1896] con-
sidered that the organization of the factories by 1887 was “as
diverse as the number of factories.”
The Privatization of the Tobacco Monopoly: The motivations for
privatizing the tobacco monopoly derived from the difficulties
the government faced in balancing the public budget. By 1887-
1888, according to the state’s general budget, the funding needs
rose to 65,812,000 pesetas [Instituto de Estudios Fiscales, 1976].
The tobacco industry was a profitable activity in spite of the
previously mentioned efficiency problems. It represented one of
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the main sources of income for the state, but the government
considered that the contribution of tobacco to the public fi-
nances could increase if certain reforms were implemented.
Throughout the century, the industry faced a quasi-permanent
excess of demand which the state had tried to address through
an expansion of the number of factories [Alonso Alvarez, 1996].
At the time of privatization, new technologies had become avail-
able, so the required expansion could have been achieved either
through the mechanization of the production process or by add-
ing more factories to the existing ones. Both these alternatives
implied the allocation of additional resources to the industry.
Additionally, a speedy reform under public management was
thought to be difficult to achieve, so the chosen alternative was
to lease the industry’s management to a private firm, something
that would perpetuate state control and simultaneously facilitate
the introduction of the required reforms [Torres Villanueva,
1998].
Moreover, according to the Treasury Minister, the mainte-
nance of public management addressed another problem. The
turnover of head officers in the ministry created serious difficul-
ties in the design and implementation of a reform agenda. Pri-
vate management, by contrast, with the incentive of significant,
though deferred gains, would implement the required reforms to
enhance performance.
The law authorizing the lease of the tobacco monopoly was
enacted on April 22, 1887. The law required that the lessee be a
Spanish company, independent of foreign groups, and that the
duration of the lease be fixed at 12 years. The contractor was
subject to a yearly rental, composed of a fixed amount (canon)
plus a variable amount that depended on yearly profits. The
term of the contract was divided into four sub-periods for calcu-
lation purposes. The canon consisted of a moving average, the
amount to be paid calculated as follows. For the first three
years, the canon was 90 million pesetas. For the second sub-
period, the fixed amount would be the average of only the sec-
ond and third years. A like computation was performed for the
third and fourth sub-periods, the canon being the average of the
prior sub-period. The variable part of the payment depended on
the difference between net income and the canon. If net income
was lower than the fixed amount established for that period, the
contractor would bear the loss. In the opposite case, the surplus
was shared equally between the state and the lessee.
The contractor was to maintain the existing factories, build
three new warehouses in the first three years of the contract,
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and construct three new factories with all the modern advances
[Art. 8, Law 22nd, April 1887] during the first half of the con-
tract. These investments were to be repurchased by the state at
the term of the contract, thus requiring the previous approval of
the Treasury Minister. The lessee would take over all the con-
tracts signed by the Treasury. Once expired, the lessee could
begin to contract with new suppliers. However, the government,
in order to promote agricultural development, imposed the re-
quirement that a certain volume of tobacco leaves had to be
imported from the colonies and the Canary Islands.
The lessee had to preserve the number, types, and prices of
existing products. While modifications to existing products re-
quired the approval of the Treasury, innovations only required
notification to the Steering Agency. The contract established a
distinction between employees (managers and clerks, formerly
state employed) and workers. The lessee was committed to
maintain at least 75% of the workers employed in the factories
in 1886-1887. The hiring of new employees was not regulated.
The lessee could hire its own employees, who would be subject
to private rules rather than laws formerly imposed by the state.
Finally, a public monitoring system was devised. This was
grounded in three fundamental bases: (i) intervention and direct
control, (ii) a fee to assure the proper care of productive assets,
and (iii) the imposition of a system of penalties that could imply
the rescission of the contract. Direct control and intervention
were the responsibility of a governmental delegate who would
work at the head offices of the lessee, at the expense of the
contractor. The delegate’s duties included the physical inspec-
tion of different business locations, raw materials, and produc-
tion, as well as the audit of accounting records, whether at the
corporate or factory level. The main concern was to monitor the
regularity of accounting operations. The governmental delegate
could veto any decision that could harm the state’s interests. The
contract included legal sanctions for any potential breach of the
contract. While the sanctions were mainly financial penalties,
they could lead to the rescission of the contract.
The strict conditions imposed by the law and the resources
required to run the tobacco industry1 may have inhibited the
1 The contract included the possibility for the state to obtain a loan from the
lessee [Art. 19]. The amount of this loan was fixed at 8 million per remaining
year of the contract which meant that, at the time of the concession, the State
could claim 96 million pesetas. Additionally, the contract required the lessee to
deposit a fee [20 million]. Loan, fee, and minimum rental [90 million] repre-
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bidding process. Additionally, the importance of the tobacco
monopoly for the state’s finances forced the government to be
very cautious over its choice of agent. Therefore, while the pro-
posal of the leasing law was being discussed by Parliament, the
government began a bargaining process with a particular candi-
date, the Bank of Spain, which at that time was a private com-
pany, but one that was highly dependent upon its relationships
with the state.2 The government knew that with the Bank being
in charge of the tobacco industry, there would be no threat of
bankruptcy or fraud since all the Bank’s other relationships
served as collateral. Additionally, the Bank commanded the re-
quired financial resources needed to develop the industry. The
government exerted a strong pressure on the Bank to assure that
the tobacco industry would be assigned to it despite the exist-
ence of other bidders. In order to avoid competition in the bid-
ding process, the Bank’s board contacted these other potential
investors and brought them together in a joint proposal. Bank
and investors came to a private agreement before the law was
enacted on April 22, 1887. Immediately after winning the bid,
the Bank and these investors founded the Compañía Arrenda-
taria de Tabacos (CAT) to run the business.
The capital of the firm was initially 60 million pesetas of
which the Bank of Spain held one half, either directly or indi-
rectly, thus assuring its control of the CAT’s board of directors.
The capital structure of the CAT underwent major changes in its
early history as the Bank held only 20% of the total shares when
the first annual shareholders meeting took place. However, the
dominant position of the Bank was not questioned:
sented a considerable initial investment. Moreover, the lessee had to acquire
existing inventories of raw materials and stored products, which, though subject
to bargaining, amounted to approximately 50.9 million pesetas [AHBE, Sec.
789]. Putting all these figures together, the investment could be as high as 258
million pesetas, an amount that had to be added to the resources needed to run
daily operations.
2 Nevertheless, as Comin [1996, p. 149] stated, “the Bank of Spain was, until
1962, a private owned company, pursuing as such, profit maximisation in its
financial operations, in order to distribute dividends, as required by sharehold-
ers. Whereas the Bank interacted closely with the state, it did so to obtain a
return. Moreover, in those cases in which doubts on the profitability of co-
operation existed, it simply refused to collaborate with the Government, as was,
for instance, the case in 1850.” This is to say that cooperation did not imply that
the Bank was semi-public in nature. Rather, it was a fully privately-owned entity
whose shares were listed on the Madrid Stock Exchange.
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Once the issue of the social capital was solved, the
Commission thought that it should reserve for the
Organisation the majority on the Board of the new So-
ciety, as the lease management fundamental guarantee,
both to the Bank itself and to HM. government in their
reciprocal relationships [AHBE, Operaciones, no 954].
Nine directors, the general manager, and the vice-president
of the CAT were members of its board, five of whom sat on the
Bank’s board as well, thus assuring control over the firm’s activi-
ties. Additionally, the Bank monitored the CAT’s activities
strictly and controlled its cash flows. The Bank was the exclusive
financial intermediary with which the CAT was allowed to nego-
tiate. It intervened in every transaction carried out by the CAT
[Art. 37, Company’s Statutes, REBE, e22301].
THE IMPACT OF PRIVATIZATION ON
MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING SYSTEMS
Management Accounting Systems under Public Administration:
This section will focus on the tobacco factory of Seville, which
was the largest and more complex of the factories constituting
the monopoly. The activities of the factory at Seville were con-
centrated in three main product lines: cigars, cigarettes, and
plug tobacco. Additionally, some sporadic dealings in rapé
(French snuff) were undertaken. Though Spanish snuff produc-
tion was legally stopped by 1840, some accounting records were
retained in order to control existing inventories.
Under public administration, accounting was divided into two
main sections: ‘accounting office’ and ‘factories’. The factories’
accounts were the responsibility of operating managers, middle
managers, and maestras, while the accounting office was under
the charge of the accountant, assisted by several clerks and
bookkeepers. The accounting office was in charge of monitoring
and controlling the techniques developed in the factory. It exam-
ined, censored, and arranged all the factories’ accounts to assure
their conformity with the general accounts. The series of ac-
counts of the ‘accounting office’ can be divided in two catego-
ries: general accounting and treasury (cash) (see Figure 1).
The factories’ accounts were comprised of six basic sets of
accounts: Cigars, Plug Tobacco, Cigarettes, Rapé, Snuff, and In-
tervention. These described in physical units the different pro-
ductive processes and screened the progress of raw material
through production stages [e.g., legs. 1640, 2176, and libros
1082, 1084, AHFTS]. Raw materials were received in General
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FIGURE 1
Factories’ Accounting Under Public Administration
GENERAL ACCOUNTS
1. Alcaidía: reception and
outlet of tobacco
2. General Manufactur-
ing Accounts:
2.1. Packaging and
Bottling
2.2. Finished Products
2.3. Tobacco Leaves
3. Statements to be sent
to Central Administra-
tion:
3.1. Public incomes
3.2. Public expenses
3.3. Budgets and
consignments
3.4. Cost accounts
4. Inventories and
General Re-weights
5. Outlet Accounts
TREASURY
1. General Charge/
discharge Accounts
2. Balance Books
3. Justifications and
Expenses Book
4. Payment Justifications
5 Auxiliary book for cash
entries
6. Salaries and wages
7. List of workshop
employees
8. Retention (liabilities,
pension, etc.)
FACTORIES
1. Cigars
1.1. General account:
1.1.1. Stores
1.1.2. General
summary
1.1.3. Weekly notes
1.1.4. Annual
account
1.2. Cigars
1.3. Workshops
1.4. Finished Products
2. Plug Tobacco
2.1. Tobacco leaves
in stores
2.2. Plug in Machines
2.3. Bottled Plug
2.4. Plug in distribu-
tion stage
3. Cigarettes
3.1. Workshops
3.2. Notebooks
4. Snuff
4.1. Snuff account
5. Rapé
5.1. Tobacco leaves
5.2. Rolls
5.3. Machines
5.4. Repose
5.5. Fermentation
6. Intervention
6.1. Materials
entrance and
outlet
6.2. General outlet
6.3. Bills
ACCOUNTING OFFICE
Store, where different accounts were held to register the recep-
tion and subsequent reallocation of tobacco leaves and auxiliary
materials to the different factories and workshops. Operating
managers had to render accounts for the raw material distrib-
uted to each workshop; the volume of discards, stems, or waste;
and the final production manufactured daily. Changes reflected
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by these accounts were shaped by modifications in production
processes or products.
The same accounts were registered in “Intervention” so that
the accounting office could check the figures exhibited [e.g.,
libro 599, AHFTS]. When discrepancies were found, the ac-
counting office started the process of determining who was re-
sponsible. Otherwise, the accounts were summed and checked
in order to forward them to the pertinent offices in Madrid,
where the figures were rechecked and compared with the re-
sources allocated to each factory.
The General Accounts were comprised of five basic sets of
accounts that had to be sent to several public institutions. Re-
ception and Outlet of Tobacco and Other Materials [e.g., libros
1074, 1080 AHFTS] controlled for all factors of production en-
tering and exiting the factory. General Manufacturing Accounts
[e.g., leg. 2286, AHFTS] were compiled on the basis of informa-
tion provided by the factories’ accounts. There were three differ-
ent accounts (Packaging and Bottling, Finished Products, and To-
bacco Leaves), all of which tracked the inventories of all
materials and production by class of product. These accounts
were kept in physical units since their main purpose was to help
the central services devise the operations schedule. The SATM
established the monthly volume to be manufactured of every
product in every factory, taking into account consumption
trends in different geographical areas, the existing inventories in
the factories, and their productive capacity. The Statements to be
Sent to the Central Offices [e.g., leg. 2169, AHFTS] included four
basic accounts (Public Revenues, Public Expenses, Budgets, and
Consignments, and Cost Accounts). While the first of these was
not relevant in the context of the factory, Public Expenses and
Budgets reported the basic accounts for decision-making pur-
poses. Financial resources were allocated using monthly budgets
prepared by the factories, while expense accounts served to cer-
tify the use of such resources. Yearly cost calculations were also
to be sent to the central offices. Inventories and General Re-
weights [e.g., leg. 2357, AHFTS] tracked the physical inventories
that were carried out yearly. Finally, in Outlet Accounts [e.g.,
libro 902, AHFTS], all items that left the factory were recorded.
Finally, the Treasury (cash) section included a set of eight
accounts that controlled the flow of cash, as well as the source
materials documenting those flows. The General Charge/Dis-
charge Cash Account was the most important as it provided the
basic information required to compile the Statements to be Sent
to the Central Offices.
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The charge/discharge bookkeeping method allowed a strict
control of tobacco flow. As a reflection of the fiduciary nature of
ownership, accounting systems under public administration
were complex and subject to duplication. The main purpose of
these systems was to ensure the proper use of public resources,
but they provided little help in decision making. Operating man-
agers, the accountant, and the factory’s director were considered
personally responsible for any shortage of tobacco. Accounting
was the basic tool utilized to control their behavior.
To sum up, the main characteristics of the accounting sys-
tems under public direct management were:
1. Heterogeneity in the specific accounting systems
implemented in the factories. This derived from the
concern with monitoring the physical flows at the vari-
ous stages of production. Accounting systems were
highly dependent on the nature and organization of the
production process.
2. Accounting systems focused on ensuring the legal
use of resources, both physical and financial, leaving
aside managerial aspects. This lack of managerial con-
cern was enhanced by two factors: (i) the profitability
of the industry guaranteed by the monopoly, and (ii)
the fragmenting of the monopoly into three main
branches (acquisition, manufacturing, and distribu-
tion), each managed by different administrative enti-
ties. To a large extent, there was no accounting consid-
eration of the business as a whole.
Post-privatization Management Accounting Systems: Despite the
general agreement that it is not ownership itself but managerial
accountability that may fundamentally distinguish public from
private enterprises [e.g., Vickers and Yarrow, 1988; Donahue,
1989; Jensen, 1989; Zeckhauser and Horn, 1989; Goodman and
Loveman, 1991], most of the research on privatization has fo-
cused on the financial effectiveness of such processes rather
than on the differences in methods utilized to control manage-
rial behavior. Agency theory predicts that privatization will lead
to the design of new managerial controls, including accounting
systems. However, research has focused on capital markets as a
means to monitor management. This is the general case in
Anglo-Saxon settings where capital markets are well-developed.
This assumption, however, is not so clear in contexts such as
less-developed countries, like 19th century Spain, where exter-
nal control mechanisms were weak and economic activity in
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general appeared to be strongly influenced by government. In
these cases, the role of the state and the kind of capital the
privatized firm attracted may help to explain the impact of
privatization on the design of control mechanisms.
The privatization of the tobacco monopoly brought about,
in accordance with the theoretical predictions, a change in man-
agement accounting systems. However, the change was not im-
mediate. At first, the CAT decided to keep the basics of the
former system so that managers could study information needs
and the most efficient ways to satisfy them, while simply intro-
ducing some modifications to provide more useful information.
However, the intention of the CAT to change the accounting
system was made clear immediately after privatization. This was
reflected in a letter of July 8, 1887:
. . . while this General Direction decides how should the
Tobacco Factories’ accounting be organised and the
way in which charge and discharge books should be
kept by the different units under your responsibility,
you shall continue accounting operations according to
the current system [AIFTS, leg. 354].
In January 1889, a new accounting system was imple-
mented [AIFTS, leg.2]. The CAT designed an integrated system,
common to all the factories. The system was articulated on four
basic accounts: Tobacco Leaves, Packaging and Bottling, Manu-
facturing, and Cash. The Manufacturing and Cash accounts rep-
resented the basic instruments of overall management and con-
trol, while the Tobacco Leaves and Bottling and Packaging
accounts were used mainly for internal control inside the indi-
vidual factory. The Cash account was considered the most im-
portant for it served to articulate the general accounting for the
enterprise.
These four accounts were prepared on the basis provided by
a set of auxiliary accounts that described the different activities
developed in the factories: Work in Progress [e.g., libro 600,
AIFTS], Stored Products [e.g., libro 583, AIFTS], General Manu-
facturing Expenses [e.g., libro 585, AIFTS], and Losses and Ben-
efits in Different Materials [e.g., libro 599, AIFTS] (see Figure 2).
Finally, the system included four auxiliary books for Interven-
tion and Cash [e.g., libros 592-597, AIFTS].
As shown in Figure 2, the pivot of the new system was the
Work in Progress account. This book contained a separate sheet
for every product, with debits for all manufacturing expenses
and credits for finished products transferred to General Store.
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FIGURE 2
Factories’ Accounting Under Private Management
Tobacco Leaves
General Manufacturing Expenses
Profits/Losses in Different Materials
Packaging and Bottling
Cash
Manufacturing
Stored
Products
Work in
Progress
➤ ➤
This account was related to the Packaging and Bottling, Tobacco
Leaves, General Manufacturing Expenses, and Losses/profits from
Different Materials accounts. The latter monitored the use of
prime or auxiliary materials, being debited for scrap, waste, or
stems of tobacco leaves, useless packaging, and other auxiliary
materials and credited when these residuals, by-products, or
stem were sold out. The Manufacturing account and the Work in
Progress accounts showed a similar structure, both disclosing
the cost at the factory level (that is, without including the appor-
tionment of general administration and distribution costs) of
the manufactured products.
The Tobacco Leaves, Packaging and Bottling, Work in
Progress, Stored Products, and Cash accounts were to be bal-
anced monthly with the results sent to Madrid within the period
spanning the last day of the closing month and the first days of
the next month. This duty was subject to financial sanctions (of
25 pesetas in 1889 [leg. 2, AIFTS]). Accounting information was
complemented by other statements containing information on
employees, budgets, and entry inspections of raw materials that
were not classified as accounting data per se.
Cost accounting also experienced significant changes in two
respects. First, costing records became fully integrated into the
main accounting system. Costs were determined monthly in the
Work in Progress account and were also reflected in the Manu-
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facturing account, corroborating the findings of Boyns and
Edwards [1997] for the U.K. coal, iron, and steel industries. The
integration of cost calculations in the general accounting system
enhanced the regularity of reporting both because costs were
reported monthly and because factories complied with these re-
quirements. Under public administration, the tobacco factories
had been required to prepare yearly cost calculations, but this
information was not regularly reported.
Cost calculations underwent a major transformation since
the common price per type of raw material was abandoned in
order to calculate what was termed ‘real’ cost of products
[Delgado, 1896]. Prior to privatization, the Treasury calculated a
common weighted cost for raw materials. The reason for this, as
stated by the Treasury, was to avoid differences in costs due to
the variability of purchase prices. To resolve this problem, the
accounting office provided factories with a yearly weighted-av-
erage cost of raw materials to be used by all factories. Cost
information was required to control the efficiency within the
different factories, so it made no sense to account for cost differ-
ences that were beyond the scope of managerial control. The
CAT understood that with this system some ‘low class’ products
were subsidizing ‘high class’ products, resulting in incorrect cal-
culations of product margins. This could affect decision making
with regard to product mix. Hence, immediately after
privatization, the calculation method was changed to one based
on using the real cost of the raw material consumed. Overheads
continued to be allocated using the same system as under public
control; i.e., they were allocated to products either according to
the volume of raw material or the level of production. Cost re-
ports included the matching of sales revenues against the cost
associated with particular products, providing information
about the profitability of individual product lines.
The Use of Cost Reports: Several uses of cost accounting may be
outlined. First, cost accounting was used for inventory valua-
tion. According to the 1885 Code of Commerce [Art. 157], pri-
vate corporations should prepare and publish a monthly balance
sheet in the Madrid Gazette. To comply with this requirement,
inventories had to be valued. Second, evidence of the use of cost
calculations for decision making appeared immediately after
privatization, although still based on the public accounting sys-
tem. For instance, cost information was used for production
decisions. The new calculation method revealed, as was men-
tioned above, that some high class products were not profitable
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for the CAT, as was the case for two types of cigars, Conchas and
Regalías. The 1887-1888 annual report explained this issue:
The existing products and their related costs called the
attention of the Board of Directors who soon felt the
need to rectify the former simulated cost calculations,
in order to know the real return of every product. It is
clear that those products requiring high quality tobacco
leaves . . . benefited from such system [use of weighted
average prices for raw material], damaging all those
products consuming low quality leaves. The production
of Conchas and Regalias were first interrupted and, af-
ter getting the governmental permission definitively
eliminated [Memoria 1887/88, CAT, p. 14, AIFTS].
Another example of the use of cost information for decision
making is also to be found in 1887. The CAT needed to reorga-
nize workshops. As long as the number of workers could not be
dramatically reduced, efforts were devoted to reducing labor
costs. For instance, in a letter addressed to a factory manager on
October 3, 1887, the company’s general director said:
I hereby order the elaboration and dispatch to this of-
fice as soon as possible of a detailed statement contain-
ing the special, long and short, tipped and sticked,
white and tobacco paper, cigarettes existing in that Fac-
tory as at 30 September. The statement shall show
firstly their value at cost, secondly their value at sales
price, and thirdly gross margin of the previously men-
tioned products. These statements should be accompa-
nied by another showing the amount paid by hundred
thousands of those products as wage expenses, disclos-
ing the information by the different tasks stated in the
Regulation no3, 5 October 1883.
Afterwards you will show how much a worker in
those tasks could earn during both a day and a month,
without any kind of limitation in scheduled tasks.
Lastly, you shall propose the modifications and reduc-
tions you consider to be convenient in piece-rate, so
that they diminish to a fair rate that, providing the
worker with appropriate earnings according to the deli-
cacy of their work, does not result in such a significant
disproportion [Carta no 197, legajo 354, AHFTS].
The CAT gathered proposals from all the factories and
modified piece rates accordingly. The use of cost information
for labor cost reduction is also in evidence, in 1891 when a
modification of the Work in Progress account was enacted. A
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new format was introduced, disclosing information on the use
of raw material, and other uses of cost reports were suggested.
The purposes of this reform, as stated by the CAT, were the
following:
. . . . (i) to determine the maximum of stem, dust, waste
and disposals that should result as average in the
manufacturing and use of cut tobacco. . . ; (ii) to estab-
lish adequate wages for all tobacco products in every
Factory; (iii) . . . thereby we will be able to determine
which Managers have devoted their efforts to comply
with the Company’s wishes; which ones have done their
best, but did not succeed because of problems they
surely will solve in the future; and, finally, which ones
are opposing passive resistance to what is established in
the Regulations. . . . While the previous period was con-
sidered as a test-period . . . since this current month we
will punish those who do not achieve the outcomes that
logically can be expected [Legajo no 4, AIFTS].
This document suggests the use of cost reports for labor
cost reduction, the establishment of standards, and managerial
performance evaluation. According to the evidence found,
privatization had no major implications for labor control which
continued as it had done under public administration. Cigar
rollers’ production was carefully tracked since it constituted the
basis for the determination of their salaries. Supervisors
(maestras) were in charge of ‘receiving’ the production, rejecting
those products that did not conform to specifications, and re-
cording the daily production of the workshops. As mentioned
above, both technical standards and piece rates were fixed by a
number of regulations. The CAT tended to concentrate its efforts
in those areas that were perceived as critical for the success of
the company. As far as the work of the factories was concerned,
the major problem was not to control the time of workers, but
ensure the quality of their production, which was the responsi-
bility of supervisors and managers.
Cost accounting provided information to monitor manage-
rial behavior. The CAT’s main purpose was to avoid laxness in
the inspection of materials and products. Several reasons may
explain this lack of concern with disciplining labor. Cigar rollers
were subject to piece-rate wage systems that reduced the pres-
sure to control time, but rather provided economic incentives to
comply with budgeted production. However, controlling for ab-
senteeism could have been an important issue, taking into ac-
count the characteristics of tobacco production which required
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high skills and dexterity. Absenteeism was high, but it did not
represent a major problem because the existence of slack re-
sources ensured that production schedules were easily met. Ad-
ditionally, a fundamental reason lay in the role the government
played protecting the cigar rollers against the CAT. This was
evident immediately after the privatizing of the monopoly
[Comín and Martín-Aceña, 1999]. The first president of the CAT
initially attempted to impose a more severe disciplinary regime
by reducing the flexibility of timetables and controlling for ab-
senteeism in the Madrid factory. Cigar rollers reacted, as usual,
in a rather violent way, and the president decided to lock the
factory. The government reacted immediately, ordering the fac-
tory to be reopened. As a result of this confrontation, the presi-
dent resigned, and the CAT came to understand that avoiding
conflicts with labor was more important than increasing disci-
pline if good relations were to continue with the government.
DISCUSSION
Privatization processes represent an area of growing inter-
est the economics and management literature. However, re-
search has focused on developed economies characterized by
strong, external control mechanisms. Evidence relating to con-
texts in which external control mechanisms are not well-devel-
oped remain scarce. Moreover, little is known about the impact
of such processes on accounting systems. This paper by address-
ing the case of the 1887 Spanish tobacco monopoly privatization
attempts to add evidence on the impact of the shift in ownership
on management accounting systems.
The privatization of the tobacco monopoly brought about
the use of cost accounting for inventory valuation, decision-
making, and performance evaluation purposes. Privatization
meant the emergence of a new philosophy with regard to the
objectives of the firm. A focus on efficiency and profitability
replaced the former emphasis on legality and fraud prevention.
In this paper, it is argued that these new concerns, and the
subsequent change in the management accounting system, were
shaped by the contracts regulating the CAT’s activities that, in
fact, reflected the influence of the two main principals, the state
and the Bank of Spain.
The influence of the Bank of Spain is evident in both the
foundation of the CAT and its further development. The
Company’s Act ensured the Bank’s domination of the board of
directors and the shareholder’s annual meeting in spite of its
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stake of only 20% of the shares. The Bank designed a highly
centralized organization in which managers acted as a mere link
between the board and the factories. Two reasons explain the
Bank’s incentive to exert direct control. On the one hand, the
Bank was linked to the tobacco industry by the tacit commit-
ment it held from the state. Any change in its status as the major
shareholder could affect its relationship with the government
and would damage the Bank’s other business. On the other
hand, the Bank itself was an agent and, as such, it tried to
protect the interests of its shareholders. These were not always
aligned with the CAT’s shareholders’ interests.3
Since granting the monopoly and retaining ownership of
long-term assets, the state became the CAT’s other major princi-
pal, as their relationship was regulated by the leasing contract.
The government’s attitude towards the tobacco monopoly expe-
rienced a major shift. This change is to be seen both with the
sudden concern about profitability and efficiency and in the
state’s determination to discipline the CAT’s management
[Aharoni, 2000] over the role of accounting information. Several
factors may explain the state’s focus on profitability. First, and
most obviously, the rental depended on net income. Second,
information asymmetry was high since the governmental del-
egate had no seat on the board of directors. Although the state’s
representative was given broad powers in the management of
the industry, it was accounting information that became the
basic control mechanism. Third, the leasing contract forced the
CAT to keep “proper and regular” accounting information with
the delegate controlling compliance with this requirement. Fi-
nally, the financial pressure and the strategic constraints im-
posed by the leasing contract resulted in cost-saving strategies
as the clearest way to improve performance [Uttley and Hooper,
1993].
To sum up, changes in the ownership structure not only
brought about new incentives to control, but a fundamental
shift in the object of control, with profitability and efficiency
now privileged. These new economic concerns induced demands
3 Evidence of the existence of conflicts of interest between the CAT and the
Bank of Spain is ample. For instance, the Bank impeded any issue of shares
since it obtained significant gains on its loans to the CAT [Comín and Martín
Aceña, 1999]. Likewise, in the discussions preceding the reform of the Company
Act in 1894, minority shareholders contested the dominance of the Bank in the
management of the CAT and its position as the exclusive financial institution.
However, this situation remained unchanged [AHBE, legajo 789].
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for accounting information and a system redesign to generate
the data required. While accounting systems both before and
after privatization enabled coordination of flows between oper-
ating units, the new system was implemented both for decision-
making and performance-evaluation purposes. Simplification,
uniformity, and the integration of cost calculations in the main
accounting systems were the major features of the new system,
facilitating its implementation and enhancing compliance with
accounting reporting norms.
Efficient decision making required the provision of timely,
uniform, and regular information. These were basic prerequi-
sites for the quality statistical information considered essential
for decision making [Delgado, 1896]. Simplification of the sys-
tem allowed a greater regularity and timeliness without increas-
ing agency costs. Double-entry bookkeeping was critical in
achieving this simplification and encouraged the required de-
gree of control over activities. Uniformity of accounting records
between factories permitted the board of directors to centralize
decision making. Finally, the integration of cost calculations in
the general accounting system of the CAT increased compliance
with cost accounting duties, allowing performance appraisal
and control over factory managers.
The evidence presented is consistent with recent literature
on privatization which highlights the need to focus on the role
of government and the capital structure in contexts where exter-
nal control mechanisms are not well-developed [Dharwadkar,
2000; Ramamurti, 2000; Toninelli, 2000]. Future, comparative
work on the design and development of management systems in
regulated and emerging economies will certainly enhance our
understanding of the underpinnings of such systems.
CONCLUSIONS
Accounting historians have drawn on two main theoretical
perspectives to explain the motives for the emergence of cost
accounting practices and understanding its implications. The
economic rationalists and Foucauldian perspectives both locate
the emergence of administrative coordination in the U.K. and
U.S. during the late 18th and early 19th centuries. The major
points of disagreement are to be found in (i) the concept of
modern managerial control, (ii) the motives behind its emer-
gence, and (iii) the implications of such practices.
Economic rationalists have argued that cost accounting
emerged in response to new demands for managerial control.
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They suggest that factors such as size and complexity, competi-
tive pressures, technology, and/or the need for coordination are
the prime engines for accounting change. This perspective takes
an implicit economic rationale that has been criticized for tak-
ing a functionalist view of organizations, neglecting other wider
social, political, and cultural factors.
Foucauldian scholars have provided an alternative explana-
tion for the emergence of modern managerial control. The
translation of writing, examining and grading practices into the
economic sphere [Hoskin and Macve, 2000] is considered to
represent the major discontinuity in the history of accounting in
the last three centuries. The application of these technologies to
monitor worker performance allowed the implementation of a
new disciplinary regime that enabled hierarchical surveillance
[Hoskin and Macve, 1994]. An important aspect of this new
disciplinary regime was the development of standards of work
performance. This managerialism was exercised grammato-
centrically and allowed the implementation of a positive system
of power [Hoskin and Macve, 2000].
There have been various challenges to both perspectives
[e.g., Hoskin and Macve, 2000; Boyns and Edwards, 1996, 2000].
However, for the purposes of this paper, one aspect is especially
relevant. The main emphasis of the Foucauldian perspective has
been to pinpoint the genesis of managerialism, identifying the
moment and place when modern managerial control can be said
to have emerged. This perspective offers limited assistance in
explaining localized cases of accounting change, such as the one
presented in this paper, where no changes in labor control were
found. Economic perspectives, by contrast, offer a more general
framework with which to address the study of accounting
change at any level. This paper has tended toward the economic
rationalist perspective.
It has been shown that the main characteristics of the in-
dustry remained stable. Factors such as size and complexity,
technology, competitive pressure, and the need for coordination
were not subject to major upheaval. In spite of this stability, the
accounting system underwent significant change shaped by the
shift in ownership. Privatization gave rise to new agency rela-
tionships; the contracts regulating them provided new incentives
to control and, hence, new demands for accounting information.
The evidence provided in this paper shows how cost accounting
contributed to the monitoring of managerial performance. How-
ever, while the use of cost accounting for decision making (e.g.,
product mix or labor cost reduction) appeared immediately after
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privatization, it was in 1891 that its use for managerial control
was explicitly stated as an objective. This is consistent with
Chandler’s [1977] analysis of the U.S. managerial revolution
where, as Boyns and Edwards [1996: p. 41] have highlighted,
“information originally conceived to enable efficient coordina-
tion was recognized as having potential to assess managerial
performance.” When comparing Anglo-Saxon and non-Anglo-
Saxon contexts, although there may be similarities in the nature
and direction of accounting change, significant differences may
be found in the factors giving rise to such changes.
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